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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD and 
STEPHEN WHITEHEAD, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
v. 
LARRY ANDERSON, VARIABLE 
ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants, Case No. 19645 
and 
AMERICAN MOTORS SALES CORPORATION 
and JEEP CORPORATION, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
American Motors Sales Corporation and 
Jeep Corporation 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries sustained 
by plaintiffs on October 1G, 1979, when the vehicle in which 
they were riding, a Jeep Commando, manufactured eight years 
earlier in 1971, was struck from behind by defendant Larry 
Anderson, causing plaintiffs' vehicle to roll over. 
Plaintiffs alleged that defendant Anderson was negligent and 
that he was in the course and scope of his employment with 
defendant Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company at the time 
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of the accident. Plaintiffs later joined defendants Jeep 
Corporation and American Motors Sales Corporation, claiming 
that their vehicle, manufactured by defendant Jeep 
Corporation in 1971 and originally marketed by defendant 
American Motors Sales Corporation during the 1972 model year, 
was defectively designed and therefore unreasonably dangerous 
at the time it left the hands of the manufacturer. See 
Section 402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts; Ernest W. Hahn, 
Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P. 2d 152 (Utah 1979). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Following trial to a jury, the Fourth Judicial 
District Court in and for Utah County, Utah, J. Robert 
Bullock, District Judge, presiding, entered judgment on the 
jury verdict for the plaintiff Stephen Whitehead and against 
all defendants in the total amount of $1,638,125.00. 
Liability on the judgment was apportioned pursuant to further 
findings by the jury that defendants Jeep Corporation and 
American Motors Sales Corporation were 70% responsible for 
the injuries sustained by Mr. Whitehead and that defendants 
Anderson and Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company were 30% 
responsible. The claim of plaintiff Deborah Whitehead has 
been dismissed with prejudice and is not an issue in this 
appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants American Motors Sales Corporation and 
Jeep Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "AMC/Jeep") seek 
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reversal of the trial court's judgment against them on the 
grounds that the trial court made incorrect and prejudicial 
rulings on questions of law and with respect to the admis-
sibility of certain evidence. Indeed, AMC/Jeep contends that 
the trial court abandoned any pretext of impartiality during 
the course of the trial and that the jury was permitted to 
hear only one side of this case. Specifically, the trial 
court erred (a) in permitting plaintiffs to introduce ir-
relevant and inflammatory evidence, (b) in denying AMC/Jeep's 
fundamental right to cross-examine plaintiffs' witnesses; (c) 
in refusing to permit AMC/Jeep to rebut such evidence by 
excluding substantial portions of AMC/Jeep's own evidence; 
(d) in denying AMC/Jeep's motion for mistrial based on im-
proper closing arguments by opposing counsel; (e) in refusing 
to permit appellant Jeep Corporation to amend its answer to 
include a statute of limitations defense; (f) in refusing to 
direct a verdict in favor of AMC/Jeep in light of their 
statute of limitations defense; and (g) in excluding all 
evidence relating to the presence of and plaintiffs' failure 
to utilize available seat belts. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
^* Background Facts. 
Sometime prior to 1966, the Kaiser-Jeep Corporation 
designed and began to manufacture a vehicle called the Jeep 
Commando. In 1970, American Motors Corporation purchased all 
outstanding shares of capital stock of Kaiser-Jeep 
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Corporation from Kaiser Industries Corporation, and the name 
Kaiser-Jeep Corporation was changed to Jeep Corporation. (R. 
219, 671). This litigation revolves around a particular Jeep 
Commando manufactured by Jeep Corporation in December, 1971, 
(T., 10/25/83, at 930; R. 2710), nearly eight years before 
plaintiffs' accident, for sale by appellant American Motors 
Sales Corporation during the 1972 model year, at least seven 
years before plaintiffs1 accident. 
The Commando at issue in this case was purchased in 
"used" condition by George Mollner of Orem, Utah in 1975 or 
1976, (T., 10/19/83, at 336; R. 2105), Mr. Mollner made 
several repairs and alterations to the Commando, (id.., at 
336-338, 343, 347-355; R. 2105-2107, 2112, 2116-2124), and on 
October 16, 1979, permitted his daughter, plaintiff Deborah 
Whitehead, to use the Commando to move some household items, 
(^ d., at 338; R. 2107). Deborah Whitehead picked up her 
husband, plaintiff Steven Whitehead, in American Fork, Utah, 
and proceeded to drive him on Interstate 15 towards 
Springville. (Id., at 375-376; R. 2144-2145). After plain-
tiffs had been on the freeway for several miles, and while 
they were traveling at approximately 50 to 55 miles per hour, 
the Commando was struck from behind by another vehicle, an 
Oldsmobile, driven by defendant Larry Anderson. (j[d., at 
377-382; R. 2146-2147). At the time it struck plaintiffs' 
Commando, defendant Anderson's Oldsmobile was traveling at 
the rate of 65 to 70 miles per hour; 15 miles per hour faster 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
than plaintiffs. (T., 10/20/83, at 552; R. 2327)- The 
Oldsmobile struck the Commando on its left rear corner, 
causing it to spin in a clockwise manner (Id., at 556; R. 
2329). The Commando went out of control (T., 10/19/83, at 
382; R. 2151), and eventually rolled over and came to rest in 
the median. (Id.., at 383; R. 2152). During the course of 
the accident, Deborah and Steven Whitehead sustained various 
injuries, the most serious of which was a spinal chord injury 
sustained by Steven Whitehead resulting in paraplegia. (Id., 
at 447; R. 2216) . 
Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint herein on 
October 11, 1979, naming only Larry Anderson, the driver of 
the car that struck the Commando from behind, as a defendant. 
(R. 7-8). Plaintiffs subsequently added Anderson's employer, 
Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company as a defendant, and 
finally filed their Second Amended Complaint naming AMC/Jeep 
on July 31, 1980. (R. 84-87). Jeep Corporation answered the 
Second Amended Complaint on November 11, 1980. (R. 113-114). 
American Motors Sales Corporation answered the Second Amended 
Complaint on September 12, 1983. (R. 993-995). 
B. Pre-Trial Rulings. 
Trial to a jury commenced on October 18, 1983. One 
day prior to that date, however, the trial court made the 
first in a series of crucial, erroneous and prejudicial 
evidentiary rulings which were to dictate the entire 
three-week trial which followed. On October 17, 1983, the 
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trial court considered plaintiffs' Motion In Limine "to allow 
the admissibility of a certain pictorial movie developed by 
Dynamic Science, Inc. for the Insurance Institute of Highway 
Safety", purporting to depict automobiles rolling over during 
"normal" highway maneuvers. (R. 1128-1129). AMC/Jeep ob-
jected to the motion (R. 1200-1224) and to the admission of 
the film on the grounds that: (1) the Dynamic Science film 
showed Jeep CJ5s and CJ7s rolling over, not Commandos; (2) 
the tests reflected in the film were conducted under condi-
tions wholly dissimilar to the off-center rear-end collision 
which led to plaintiffs' accident; and (3) plaintiffs offered 
no foundation to show that the maneuvers depicted in the film 
were in any way relevant to the issue before the court and 
jury in this case. AMC/Jeep further objected to the film on 
the ground that it had been selectively edited to dramatize 
the rollovers and to enhance the visual impact, destroying 
the value of the film as demonstrative evidence. For 
example, the film showed anthropomorphic dummies, fully 
dressed, being tossed about violently during a rollover. 
There was no evidence that plaintiffs experienced similar 
movement during their accident. Finally, AMC/Jeep argued 
The evidence showed that CJ5s have a wheel base 20 inches 
shorter than the wheel base of a Commando. (T., 10/24/83, at 
659, 672; R. 2436, 2449.) It was also clear that a longer 
wheel base makes a vehicle more resistant to rollover. (Id., 
at 674-675; R. 2451-2452). 
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that if plaintiffs were allowed to show the film raising the 
inference that the non-Commando vehicles depicted in it were 
"comparable" to a Commando, AMC/Jeep should similarly be 
allowed to introduce evidence showing that, in fact, the 
Commando's handling characteristics and resistance to 
rollover compared favorably to other automobiles. (T., 
Abstracts from Transcripts of Trial, 10/17/83, at 53-59; R. 
4856-4861). The trial court nevertheless rejected AMC/Jeep's 
arguments against the Insurance Institute film and ruled that 
any difference between the tests depicted in that film and 
the actual events of plaintiffs1 accident would go "to the 
weight of it and not to the admissibility." (^ Id., at 60; R. 
4863; see also jLd., at 62; R. 4865). 
On the morning of October 18, 1983, just before the 
trial began, the trial court also addressed plaintiffs' 
Motion in Limine "to preclude the defendants or their 
witnesses or attorneys from mentioning the subject of seat 
belts or the use or nonuse of seatbelts at the trial of this 
case." (R. 1274-1294). AMC/Jeep opposed the motion arguing 
that (1) the failure of plaintiffs to utilize their seat 
belts was relevant to the issues of comparative fault and 
mitigation of damages, and (2) the presence of seat belts in 
the Commando was relevant to the question whether the 
Commando was defectively designed. Here, as throughout the 
trial, the trial court barred any comment on the presence of 
or plaintiffs1 failure to utilize the Commando's seat belts. 
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(See also T., Abstracts from Transcript of Trial, 10/24/83, 
at 88, 156; R. 4891, 4959). (T., 10/18/83, at 12; R. 
1763) . 
C. Plaintiffs1 Case in Chief. 
During the presentation of plaintiffs' case-in-
chief, Newell Knight was called as a witness for plaintiffs 
to express an opinion as to the allegedly "defective" nature 
of the accident vehicle. (T., 10/20/83, at 541; R. 2314). 
AMC/Jeep, anxious to assure that all such testimony would be 
related to Commandos and that the jury not be misled into 
believing that "a Jeep is a Jeep," attempted to limit the 
testimony to the relevant characteristics of the Commando. 
Beginning with Mr. Knight, however, the trial court embarked 
on an erroneous course of permitting plaintiffs' expert 
witnesses to lump all Jeep vehicles into the same evidentiary 
ball, (id., at 559-560; R. 2327-2328; see especially id., 
at 559-559; R. 2331-2332; id., at 560; R. 2333), thus 
obscuring the unique characteristics of the Commando. 
Plaintiffs then called LeRoy Maurice Shaw, a con-
sultant in automotive safety. (T., 10/24/83, at 631; R. 
2408). As plaintiffs' counsel began to delve into Mr. Shaw's 
opinion about the Commando's handling characteristics, 
AMC/Jeep elicited by way of voir dire that one of his basic 
exhibits — a mathematical prediction of the so-called "roll-
over threshold" of a Commando (Exhibit 56) — was actually 
based on information and data with respect to the Jeep CJ5 
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and CJ7 — not the Commando. (Id., at 672-679; R. 2450-
2457). The trial court, nevertheless, admitted the evidence 
over the objection of AMC/Jeep, (id., at 678; R. 2456), and 
then exacerbated the error by unduly restricting the right of 
AMC/Jeep to test Mr. Shaw's credibility by repeatedly sus-
taining objections to cross-examination into Mr. Shaw's 
knowledge of the design period of the accident vehicle. 
(Id., at 782-783; R. 2561-2562). 
Similarly, through their "star" witness, Robert 
Lloyd Anderson, plaintiffs were permitted to introduce two 
additional films prepared at Dynamic Science showing Jeep 
CJ5s, not Commandos, rolling over when subjected to extraor-
dinary tests never encountered under normal driving condi-
tions and certainly not encountered by plaintiffs during the 
course of their accident. AMC/Jeep objected to the admission 
of these films on the ground that they showed CJ5s, not 
Commandos, rolling over as the result of mechanically-induced 
maneuvers that bore no relation to the circumstances of 
plaintiffs1 accident. One of the tests, for example, showed 
a CJ5 undergoing a maneuver in which 240 degrees of steer is 
mechanically input into the vehicle in the span of 1.8 
seconds while the speed of the vehicle is being artificially 
maintained. (T., 10/25/83, at 910; R. 2690). No attempt 
2 
Other maneuvers depicted in the films included a "test at 
25 miles an hour and 180 degrees on the steering wheel. Then 
we go up to 270 degrees. And the next turn is 360 degrees." 
(T., 10/25/83, at 915-916; R. 2695-2700). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was made to show any connection between the maneuvers 
depicted in the film to the actual events of plaintiffs' 
accident. In fact, Mr. Anderson admitted that he had "no way 
of knowing" what type of steering maneuvers were undertaken 
by Mrs. Whitehead during the course of the accident. (Id., 
at 957; R. 2737). The trial court nevertheless overruled 
AMC/Jeep's objection to the films, stating that "I'll let you 
get at it any way you v/ant to by cross examination or 
whatever. But I'm going to admit it, I'll overrule your 
objection with respect to those films." (I^ d. , at 109; R. 
4912) . 
The objectionable films were then shown to the jury 
as exemplary of the handling characteristics of "CJ 
vehicles." (T., 10/25/83, at 906; R. 2676). The plain and 
intended implication was that the vehicles shown in those 
films were similar to the Commando and that they demonstrated 
the circumstances experienced by plaintiffs and the accident 
vehicle at the time of the accident even though Mr. Anderson 
admitted that he, in fact, had no way of knowing what 
steering movements were made by plaintiffs immediately prior 
to and during plaintiffs' accident. (I^ d., at 956-957; R. 
2736-2737). 
The ultimate point made by Mr. Anderson was that 
the handling characteristics of "Jeeps", coupled with their 
"rollover propensities", rendered the Commando involved in 
this case unreasonably dangerous. (Ij3.# at 897; R. 2677). 
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Mr. Anderson also testified that other vehicles he had 
tested, the SIO Blazer and the Chevy Chevette, did not have 
delays in handling response similar to those of a "Jeep", 
{16.., at 896; R. 2676), and that "most vehicles" would main-
tain control in situations similar to those experienced by 
plaintiffs at the time of the accident. (Id., at 1039-1040; 
R. 2818-2819). 
In its cross-examination of Mr. Anderson, AMC/Jeep 
attempted to rebut Mr. Anderson's characterization and im-
plication that "Jeeps" are more dangerous than other 
automobiles on the road by asking him: (1) whether other 
vehicles would have gone out of control if subjected to 
circumstances like those which caused plaintiffs' accident 
(id., at 963; R. 2743); (2) whether he thought that other 
vehicles with similar track widths were also defective (id., 
at 1001; R. 2780); (3) whether he thought other vehicles were 
defective (jld. ) ; (4) whether other vehicles have the same 
center of gravity as a Commando, (id.., at 1003; R. 2782); (5) 
whether all convertibles are defective if they do not have 
rollbars (^ Ld., at 1004; R. 2783); (6) whether he knows what 
other vehicles will do when subjected to the tests shown in 
the films (id., at 1005, 1018; R. 2784, 2797); and (7) 
whether CJ5s have different suspensions than a Commando. 
(1^., at 1047; R. 2826). In spite of previous assurances by 
the trial court that AMC/Jeep would be permitted to cross-
examine Mr. Anderson on these issues, (T., 10/25/83, 
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Abstracts from Transcript of Trial, at 109; R. 4912), 
however, the trial court sustained plaintiffs1 objections to 
these questions and precluded AMC/Jeep from pursuing its 
cross-examination of plaintiffs' key expert witness. 
The trial court's decision to admit films of CJ5s 
to demonstrate the characteristics of a Commando combined 
with the trial court's rigid restriction of AMC/Jeep's 
cross-examination of Mr. Anderson led to AMC/Jeep's first 
Motion for Mistrial on October 26, 1983. (T., Abstracts from 
Transcript of Trial, 10/26/83, at 123; R. 4926). The grounds 
for the Motion were that plaintiffs' experts had been al-
lowed, without foundation, to declare the Commando un-
reasonably dangerous based (1) upon comparisons to other 
vehicles undergoing maneuvers in no way related to the sub-
ject accident, (2) upon certain calculations derived from 
tests of the CJ5, and (3) upon opinion testimony that "Jeeps" 
roll over more easily than "other vehicles," while AMC/Jeep 
had been barred from showing that the relevant 
characteristics of Jeeps, in fact, compared favorably with 
other vehicles. (jEd. , at 117-123; R. 4920-4926). The trial 
court, nevertheless, denied the Motion for Mistrial stating 
that "under the circumstances as they exist at this time in 
this lawsuit, the evidence of what other vehicles do is 
irrelevant." (_Id., at 130; R. 4933). The trial court later 
attempted to justify its erroneous ruling as prohibiting 
AMC/Jeep "from attempting to show that the subject Jeep in 
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this case was safe by evidence which shows that other 
vehicles not manufactured by Jeep are also unsafe." (T., 
10/26/83, at 1171; R. 2949). The trial court had, of course, 
permitted plaintiffs' experts to compare "Jeeps" with 
vehicles manufactured by others. It was only when AMC/Jeep 
sought to inquire further into that very comparative 
testimony that the trial court concluded it was irrelevant. 
In so ruling, the trial court did not even suggest to the 
jury that the comparisons adduced by plaintiffs should not be 
considered. (Id../ at 60; R. 4863; see also JLd. at 62; R. 
4865) . 
Plaintiffs' next expert witness was John N. Noettl. 
Mr. Noettl, like Mr. Anderson, brought along a film showing 
CJ5s rolling over. Mr. Noettl's film, however, also showed 
fully clothed anthropomorphic "dummies" being tossed about 
during the testing. AMC/Jeep objected to this film on the 
basis of its lack of relevance and its inflammatory nature, 
(T., Abstracts from Transcript of Trial, 10/26/83, at 131-
133; R. 4934-4936), but after being shown in chambers on 
October 26, 1983, (T., 10/26/83, at 1205; R. 2982), the trial 
court ruled that it could be admitted. As with all of plain-
tiffs1 films, there was absolutely no foundation for the 
implicit proposition that the maneuvers exhibited in the film 
were related to the maneuvers experienced by the accident 
vehicle during the accident. Mr. Noettl was then permitted 
to testify that the "Jeep" is easier to overturn than a 
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"passenger car." (Jxl., at 1262; R. 3039). As was the case 
with Mr. Anderson, however, AMC/Jeep's efforts to cross ex-
amine on this point were blocked by the trial court. (Id.., 
at 1266; R. 3043) . 
D* AMC/Jeep's Case. 
AMC/Jeep began its case on October 27, 1983. 
Before AMC/Jeep called its chief expert, however, the trial 
court heard plaintiffs' objections to two films to be intro-
duced through that expert. One film was of a CJ5 and was 
intended to rebut plaintiffs' evidence purporting to prove 
that CJ5s roll over under certain emergency situations. The 
film demonstrated the CJ5's stability when subjected to 
extreme emergency situations. (T., 10/27/83, at 1561, 1565-
1566; R. 3343, 3347-3348). The second film was similarly 
intended to rebut plaintiffs' theory that Jeeps roll more 
often than other cars, or that Jeeps are the only vehicles 
that would have rolled under the circumstances of the plain-
tiffs' accident. Unlike plaintiffs, however, AMC/Jeep was 
precluded from presenting its evidence, the court ruling that 
neither film was admissible. (1^*/ a t 1571, 1576; R. 3353, 
3358). 
AMC/Jeep then proceeded to call Edward Heitzman, a 
mechanical engineer with extensive experience in the field of 
automobile safety. (^ d., at 1577-1587; R. 3359-3369). 
Through Mr. Heitzman, AMC/Jeep attempted to introduce a film 
showing non-Jeep vehicles undergoing certain maneuvers with 
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"outriggers" attached', for the purpose of rebutting plain-
tiffs1 film which had shown a Commando equipped with 
"outriggers". Plaintiffs1 expert, Mr. Anderson, had tes-
tified that but for the outriggers the Commando in his film 
would have rolled over. (T., 10/25/83, at 918-926; R. 2698-
2706). Mr. Heitzman testified, however, that, in his 
opinion, Mr. Anderson's film did not illustrate situations in 
which the Commando would have rolled. (T., 10/28/83, at 
1674-1676; R. 3457-3459). Mr. Heitzman would then have 
utilized his film to illustrate to the jury the difference 
between a vehicle with outriggers "rolling" and a similarly 
equipped car not rolling. The film would also have rebutted 
plaintiffs' testimony that only Jeeps, as opposed to more 
common vehicles, would roll over in emergency situations. 
AMC\Jeep needed these films in order to illustrate Mr. 
Heitzman's point that many types of vehicles — not just 
Jeeps and certainly not just Commandos — subjected to the 
conditions illustrated in plaintiffs' films will roll over. 
The films would have shown that, in fact, other vehicles 
subjected to the same type of tests would have rolled over. 
(T., 10/28/83, at 1746-1750; R. 3529-3533). The court, 
however, refused to permit the introduction of appellants' 
Outriggers are attached to a test vehicle in order to 
restrain it from rolling over completely. An expert's eye 
and ear can discern when a vehicle equipped with outriggers 
would have rolled over but for the outriggers. (T., 
10/28/83, at 1744; R. 3527). 
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film "because it's irrelevant, and it's irrelevant because 
they involve other vehicles which the jury would have to take 
into consideration as to how it was done, the comparisons, 
the whole works " (.Id., at 1746-1747, 1750; R. 3529-
3530, 3533) . 
AMC/Jeep then called Dr. Charles Warner, a 
mechanical engineer and automobile accident consultant, to 
reconstruct the accident and to give his opinion that the 
characteristics of the Commando had nothing to do with the 
extent of plaintiffs' injuries, that virtually any automobile 
would have rolled under the circumstances presented in this 
case, and that the injuries suffered by plaintiffs were not 
caused by the fact that the accident vehicle happened to be a 
Commando. A crucial aspect of Dr. Warner's testimony was his 
study and reconstruction of the probable movements of 
plaintiffs inside the vehicle during the course of the 
accident. (T., 10/31/83, at 1956-1961; R. 3743-3748). In 
support of this testimony Dr. Warner had prepared a series of 
photographs demonstrating his opinion. (JLSl*' a t 1961; R. 
3748). The trial court, however, sustained plaintiffs' 
objection to this demonstrative exhibit on the ground "that 
the probative value is limited at least because of the 
photographs not being representative of just what did happen 
to the vehicles." (^ d., at 1967; R. 3754). AMC/Jeep had, of 
course, based many of its objections to plaintiffs' evidence 
on precisely this ground. The only difference was that the 
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trial court overruled AMC/Jeep's objections but sustained 
those made by plaintiffs. 
Dr. Warner was next to testify with respect to 
certain tests he performed on an exemplar vehicle — a 
Commando. The film showed a Commando undergoing certain 
emergency maneuvers with outriggers attached and would have 
demonstrated that the Commando is a stable vehicle. The film 
would also have demonstrated Dr. Warner's opinion that the 
Commando will remain upright when subjected to realistic 
emergency situations. AMC/Jeep also intended to introduce a 
film, through Dr. Warner, demonstrating rollover and the type 
of damage that typically occurs during rollover. (_Id., at 
1976; 3764). The two films were shown in chambers (^ Ld., at 
1979-1983; R. 3767-3771), plaintiffs objected to both, and 
the trial court ruled that both were inadmissible on the 
grounds that they were "not probative of any issues except 
perhaps the test which was made . . . . " (Ijd. at 1986; R. 
3774). Again, no explanation was offered by the court as to 
why plaintiffs' film — which showed a Commando performing 
certain extreme maneuvers that one could reasonably expect to 
encounter, but of course showed roll overs whereas the Warner 
film showed none — presented probative evidence while the 
Warner film did not. 
Dr. Warner was also asked to testify as to his 
opinion regarding the movement of plaintiffs inside the 
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Commando during the course of the accident to rebut plain-
tiffs1 contention that the Commando's roof was defective and 
that it had crushed during the course of the accident causing 
plaintiff Steven Whitehead1s back injury. (See, e.g., T., 
10/24/83, at 663-664; R. 2441-2442). The trial court, 
however, excluded each and every exhibit offered to 
demonstrate this testimony. (T., 10/31/83, at 2009-2011; R. 
3797-3799). 
AMC/Jeep then made a proffer, in chambers, of Dr. 
Warner's testimony with respect to plaintiffs' failure to use 
seat belts. Dr. Warner would have testified that had plain-
tiff Steven Whitehead "been using the seat belt in all prob-
ability he would not have received the spinal injury that he 
did receive." (Ixl.# at 2018; R. 3806). The trial court 
again ruled, however, that no evidence of seat belts would be 
admitted. As the trial court put it: "to speculate what the 
seat belt might have done in this type of situation is just 
something that the jury ought not do, and they will not have, 
under my ruling, the obligation to consider. ... Therefore, 
there will be no more evidence in this case with regard to 
seat belts. I want everybody to leave it alone, and we'll go 
from there." Ud., at 2019-2020; R. 3807-3808). 
Dr. Warner was next asked to express his opinion 
with respect to the "buckling" experienced by the Commando 
during the course of the accident. Dr. Warner had examined 
the actual accident vehicle and had prepared an exhibit that 
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demonstrated his opinion that the Commando had been in a 
prior accident. It was Dr. Warner's opinion that the prior 
accident had caused damage to the Commando which resulted in 
a weakening of its structural integrity. This weakening, he 
concluded, in turn contributed to the damage suffered in the 
accident. (Id.., at 2024; R. 3812). The trial court 
sustained plaintiffs1 objection to this demonstrative exhibit 
as well, (id., at 2026; R. 3814), even though Dr. Warner had 
actually testified without objection to all of the informa-
tion in the exhibit. 
E. Closing Argument. 
Finally, after a three-week trial during which the 
record reflects plaintiffs were unrestrained in their presen-
tation of irrelevant and inflammatory evidence, AMC/Jeep was 
severely restricted by the court's rulings limiting their 
cross-examination of plaintiffs' witnesses, virtually all of 
AMC/Jeep's' demonstrative evidence had been excluded and 
their witnesses hamstrung by the court's rulings limiting 
their testimony, the ultimate effects of the trial court's 
rulings were noted in closing argument: 
(1) Plaintiffs' counsel was permitted to argue (a) 
that AMC/Jeep had offered "No positive proof. None at all."; 
(T. 11/3/83, at 32; R. 4582); (b) that "They [AMC/Jeep] bring 
no evidence, none at all," (jLd., at 33; R. 4583); and (c) 
that AMC/Jeep's experts failed to bring "an ounce of en-
gineering data" (id., at 35; R. 4585); and 
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(2) Counsel for defendant Variable Annuity Life 
made the following flatly incorrect statement to the jury: 
Why didn't Jeep, having all of the test 
data of the plaintiff's experts, knowing 
exactly what they had done, even to the 
height of the outriggers off the ground; 
why didn't they go out and get a 
Commando, put some outriggers on there 
and go do some testing of their own? Why 
didn't they come in here and tell you, 
'We have done the same kind of tests that 
the plaintiffs did, we have put the same 
number of degrees of steer in on a 
Commando, and that vehicle wouldn't turn 
over'; why didn't they do that? I'll 
tell you why: They v/ere afraid to do it. 
They didn't dare do it. Because they 
knew that Commando would turn over. 
(Id., at 109; R. 4659). 
AMC/Jeep had, of course, done precisely what coun-
sel asserted had not been done. AMC/Jeep had obtained an 
exemplar vehicle, a Commando, had tested it in the very 
respects stated in the above quotation, and proffered 
evidence of the results of those tests, both in the form of 
testimony and in the form of demonstrative motion pictures, 
but the tests were systematically and erroneously excluded by 
the trial court. AMC/Jeep's motion for a mistrial based upon 
the subsequent false, misleading and prejudicial arguments of 
opposing counsel was nevertheless denied. (jEd./ at 193, 197; 
R. 4743, 4747). 
Following these arguments the jury returned a 
Special Verdict finding: (1) that the Commando was defective 
to the extent that it was unreasonably dangerous to the 
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purchaser or user; (2) that the defective condition of the 
Commando was a proximate cause of plaintiff Steven 
Whitehead's injuries; (3) that AMC/Jeep was 70% at fault for 
the injuries sustained by plaintiff Steven Whitehead; and (4) 
that general and special damages totalled $1,638,125.00. (R. 
1359-1361). The trial court then entered judgment in accord-
ance with the Special Verdict, (R. 1362-1364), and denied 
AMC/Jeep's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, 
or in the Alternative for a New Trial (R. 1569-1574, 1642-
1644). This appeal followed. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs' claim against AMC/Jeep is predicated 
upon the theory of strict products liability set out in 
Section 402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts, as adopted by 
this Court in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P. 
2d 152 (Utah 1979). The elements which a plaintiff must 
prove under Section 402A are: 
(1) That defendant sold the product at issue in the 
case — Section 402A(l); 
(2) That such product was in a defective condition; 
that is, a condition not contemplated by the ultimate 
consumer — Section 402A(1), and Comment (g); 
(3) That such product was unreasonably dangerous; 
that is, dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with 
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the ordinary knowledge common in the community as to its 
characteristics; Section 402A(1), and Comment (i); 
(4) That the product was defective and unreasonably 
dangerous at the time it left the seller's hands — Section 
402A, Comment (g); 
(5) That the plaintiff is the ultimate consumer or 
user of the allegedly defective product; Section 402A(l); 
(6) That the product's defective and unreasonably 
dangerous condition caused the plaintiff physical harm — 
Section 402A(l); 
(7) That the defendant is engaged in the business 
of selling the allegedly defective and unreasonably dangerous 
product — Section 402A(l)(a); and 
(8) That the allegedly defective and unreasonably 
dangerous product is expected to and does reach the user or 
consumer without substantial change in the condition in which 
it is sold — Section 402A(l)(b). 
Instead or requiring plaintiffs to prove the 
elements listed above, however, the trial court permitted 
plaintiffs, over AMC/Jeep's objections, to proceed against 
AMC/Jeep with irrelevant and prejudicial evidence and expert 
testimony wholly unrelated to the sole issue raised by 
/ 
plaintiffs' claim against AMC/Jeep: Whether plaintiffs' 
Commando was defective and unreasonably dangerous at the time 
it left the hands of AMC/Jeep because it rolled over while 
traveling on an interstate highway at 55 miles per hour when 
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struck off-center from behind by a station wagon traveling 70 
miles per hour. In fact, the only things proved by 
plaintiffs at trial were: 
(1) That "Jeeps," as a class of vehicles including 
Commandos, will roll over under certain mechanically 
controlled conditions not normally encountered even under 
emergency conditions; and 
(2) That when "Jeeps" do roll over, an unre-
strained passenger in such a vehicle will be injured. 
These facts are as irrelevant to this lawsuit as 
they are undisputed. What plaintiffs failed to show was: 
(1) That Jeeps in general, and the Commando in 
particular, are any different in their resistance to roll 
over than the vast majority of vehicles on the road; 
(2) That the "ordinary consumer" had any reason to 
expect that the Commando or any other vehicle would not roll 
over under the particular circumstances of the accident made 
the basis of this lawsuit; and 
(3) That plaintiffs had any reason to expect that 
they could escape serious injury in the event of a roll over 
absent the use of available seat belts to protect them. 
As AMC/jeep's evidence would have demonstrated (had 
it not been excluded by the trial court) and as AMC/Jeep's 
cross-examination of plaintiffs' witnesses would have 
revealed (had that cross-examination been permitted): 
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(1) Most vehicles subjected to the tests reflected 
in plaintiffs1 films would have rolled over under those 
conditions; 
(2) Virtually any vehicle subjected to the 
collision made the subject of this lawsuit would have rolled 
over under those circumstances 7 and 
(3) That an unrestrained passenger in any vehicle 
which rolls over will suffer serious injuries, whether or not 
the roof collapses, because the occupants of a vehicle in 
motion tend to remain in motion after a collision until they 
are stopped by something — whether the roof, the road or the 
windshield. 
In order to prove that a product is "in a condition 
not contemplated by the ultimate consumer" and "unreasonably 
dangerous", the plaintiff in a design defect case will 
normally present evidence comparing the allegedly defective 
product to other products placed on the market at 
approximately the same time to show that the allegedly 
defective product does not meet the standards reflected in 
the industry in general. Such comparisons are generally 
referred to as "state-of-the-art" or "industry standards" 
evidence. See Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F. 2d 442, 
447 (10th Cir. 1973). Plaintiffs in this case, however, 
offered no such evidence. Instead, they offered and were 
permitted to display to the jury one film after another 
showing "Jeeps", and only "Jeeps", rolling over and over and 
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over in response to mechanically-induced test programs. 
Plaintiffs' experts were then permitted to testify, without 
any foundation whatsoever, that "other vehicles" would not 
have rolled over under the circumstances presented, and 
AMC/Jeep was precluded from either cross-examining 
plaintiffs1 witness on that subject or from presenting their 
own "industry standards" evidence to rebut it. As a result, 
the case was submitted to the jury, and the jury was 
permitted and, indeed, required to decide it based upon 
evidence in a vacuum. 
The trial court's errors which require reversal of 
the judgment on the verdict can be broken down into the 
following categories: (i) the trial court permitted 
plaintiffs to introduce irrelevant and inflammatory evidence; 
(ii) the trial court limited improperly AMC/Jeep's cross 
examination of plaintiffs' experts; (iii) the trial court 
excluded substantial portions of AMC/Jeep's evidence; (iv) 
the trial court denied AMC/Jeep's motion for mistrial based 
on improper closing arguments made by opposing counsel; (v) 
the trial court excluded all evidence relating to the 
presence of and plaintiffs' failure to utilize seatbelts; and 
(vi) the trial court denied AMC/Jeep's motion for directed 
verdict based on its statute of limitations defense. Each 
point will be addressed in turn. 
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING 
PLAINTIFFS TO INTRODUCE IRRELEVANT AND 
INFLAMMATORY EVIDENCE. 
The issue in this case is not whether, in the 
abstract, Jeeps in general or even Commandos in particular 
roll over too easily. This is not an administrative proceed-
ing to determine whether AMC/Jeep should be required to 
recall and modify its utility vehicles based upon such an 
alleged defect even if it were found to exist. The sole 
issues in plaintiffs' case against AMC/Jeep were (a) whether 
the plaintiffs' 1972 Commando was defectively designed and 
unreasonably dangerous when it left the hands of the 
manufacturer because it rolled over when struck from behind, 
on an interstate highway, by a vehicle traveling 
approximately 70 miles per hour, and (b) whether the alleged 
design defect was one proximate cause of plaintiffs1 
injuries. 
Products liability under Section 402A, Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, does not remove the requirement of 
causation from a lawsuit. See Section 402A(1), Restatement 
(Second) of Torts; Mulherin v. Ingersoil-Rand Co., 628 P. 2d 
1301, 1303 (Utah 1981). Even plaintiffs1 own expert noted 
that while the Jeep may have a defect, the defect "may not 
have anything to do with this particular accident." (T., 
10/25/83, at 934; R. 2714). Plaintiffs in this case were, 
nevertheless, allowed to "prove" their case against AMC/Jeep 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by introducing evidence that was wholly irrelevant to the 
issues presented. 
Plaintiffs1 evidence primarily showed Jeep CJ5s, 
not Commandos# overturning under conditions wholly dissimilar 
to the conditions of plaintiffs' accident. The conditions 
and maneuvers depicted in the films were never shown to bear 
any relation to the conditions and maneuvers experienced by 
plaintiffs and their Commando during the accident and this 
evidence was almost certainly misunderstood by the jury and 
given extraordinary weight since it was the only evidence 
they were permitted to hear. Under the circumstances of this 
case, the admission of such evidence is reversible error. 
Plaintiffs1 absolute reliance on irrelevant 
demonstrative evidence is clear. Even before trial began, 
plaintiffs moved the trial court to allow them to exhibit "a 
certain pictorial movie developed by Dynamic Science, Inc. 
for the Insurance Institute of Highway Safety." (R. 1128). 
AMC/Jeep opposed plaintiffs' motion, noting: (1) that the 
testing represented in the film bore no relation to the 
circumstances of plaintiffs' accident; (2) that the Dynamic 
Science testing had involved 400 test runs while the film 
showed only six of them; (3) that the film's use of slow 
motion effects was misleading; (4) that the film showed only 
CJ5s and not Commandos; (5) that the CJ5s in the film were 
"manned" with anthropomorphic dummies which portrayed 
unrealistically and violently the movement of humans during a 
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rollover; and (6) that on the whole the film's prejudicial 
impact outweighed its value as demonstrative evidence. (R. 
1207-1220). The trial court brushed aside appellants1 
objections, however, taking the view that any problems with 
the film went to its "weight" rather than its admissibility. 
(T., Abstracts from Transcripts of Trial, 10/17/83, at 60, 
62; R. 4863, 4865). 
The Insurance Institute Film was shown to the jury 
in conjunction with the testimony of Mr. Noettl. Although 
Mr. Noettl had never tested a Commando and had experience 
primarily with other "Jeep vehicles" he was, nevertheless, 
permitted to express the opinion that the "Jeep" is easier to 
overturn than a "passenger car." (Id., at 1262; R. 3039). 
(T., 10/26/83, at 1182-1183, R. 2960-2961). In fact, Mr. 
Noettl's opinion with respect to the Commando was based 
almost entirely on his experience with the CJ5 and other non-
Commando vehicles. (_Id., at 1189; R. 2966). AMC/Jeep 
interposed a continuing objection to this testimony based on 
the fact that a CJ5 was a different vehicle than a Commando 
and that Mr. Noettl was incompetent to express an opinion as 
to the Commando. (_Id., at 1191; R. 2963). Indeed, 
plaintiffs1 own witness had admitted earlier in the trial, 
for instance, that the CJ5' s v/heel base was 20 inches shorter 
than the Commando's wheel base and that a longer wheel base 
makes it more difficult to roll a vehicle. (T., 10/24/83, 
at 672-675; R. 2450-2453). Moreover, a longer wheel base 
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means that more and faster steer must be "dialed into11 a 
vehicle in order for it to negotiate the same turn as a 
vehicle with a shorter wheel base. The objections were, 
nevertheless, overruled and Mr. Noettl continued to testify, 
without foundation, that the CJ5 and the Commando were 
identical for purposes of discussing their handling 
characteristics. 
In addition, at the time the trial court viewed Mr. 
Noettl1s Insurance Institute film in chambers before it was 
shown to the jury (ixl., at 1206; R. 2983), plaintiffs' 
counsel stipulated that the film did not simulate the 
conditions prevailing at the time of the accident. (ijl*/ at 
1207; R. 2984). 
Mr. Noettl subsequently described the maneuvers 
shown on the film as "J-Turns" and "obstacle avoidance 
maneuvers," (_id.., at 1195; R. 2972), neither of which were 
shown, even remotely, to simulate the conditions of 
plaintiffs1 accident. In fact, the tests themselves were run 
with mechanical input into the CJ5 — there was no human 
driver at all. Mr. Noettl also described the ignition 
interrupt system that was installed in the test CJ5 in order 
"to maintain the vehicle at constant speed" throughout a 
particular test run. (Ld., at 1231; R. 3008). Of course, 
there was no evidence that plaintiff Deborah Whitehead, the 
driver of the Commando in this case, kept her foot on the 
accelerator throughout the course of the accident. In fact 
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there was testimony that a vehicle making a turn like those 
depicted in the film would normally slow down. (T. 10/28/83, 
at 1693-1694; R. 3476-3477). The steering commands that were 
mechanically induced for the tests were on the order of 588 
degrees of steering input at a rate of 1562 degrees per 
second. (jEd., at 1233-1234; R. 3010-3011). There was 
testimony that, due to the Commando's longer wheel base, 736 
degrees (or two complete revolutions of the steering wheel) 
would have to be dialed into a Commando in order to induce 
the same type of maneuver, (T., 10/27/83, at 1657-1659; R. 
3439-3441), and that steering input rates of 1300 to 1600 
degrees per second are "beyond human capabilities." (T., 
10/28/83, at 1689; R. 3472). There was no evidence that 
Deborah Whitehead negotiated anything resembling two complete 
revolutions of the Commando's steering wheel during the 
course of the accident, or even that the Commando's steering 
wheel was mechanically capable of two complete revolutions. 
Indeed, plaintiffs' experts had previously admitted that they 
had "no way of knowing" what steering movements were made by 
Deborah Whitehead during the course of the accident. (T., 
10/25/83, at 956-957; R. 2736-2737). 
There was also testimony that the CJ5 shown in the 
film had been modified substantially in an attempt to 
compensate for the removal of instrumentation and the 
placement of test equipment in the vehicle, (T., 10/26/83, at 
1257-1258; R. 3034-3035), that the tires on the test CJ5 were 
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"specially prepared" to accentuate rollover, and that the 
tests were "completely unrealistic." (T., 10/28/83, at 1694-
1698; R. 3477-3481; T., 11/1/83, at 2216-2217; R. 4008-4009). 
It was also clear that the film had been edited and 
manipulated to highlight the instances in which a CJ5 
actually rolled over. Mr. Noettl would later admit, for 
example, that 400 "runs" of the CJ5 were made by Dynamic 
Science but that only six would be shown in the film (ixi., at 
1214; R. 2991), and that the tests were run with mechanical 
input into the Jeep (i.e., there was no human driver). 
Another witness familiar with the Insurance Institute test 
depicted in the film testified that five hundred runs of the 
CJ5 were made by Dynamic Science and that there were only 
eight roll overs in those five hundred runs. (T., 10/28/83, 
at 1682; R. 3465). AMC/Jeepfs objections to the film were 
nevertheless overruled and the film was shown to the jury. 
(Id.). 
Two other films of CJ5s rolling over were presented 
to the jury in connection with the testimony of Mr. Anderson. 
AMC/Jeep's strenuous objection to these films was identical 
to its objection to Mr. Noettl's film. (T., 10/25/83, at 
106-107; R. 4909-4910). The trial court overruled these 
objections, however, stating only that: "I'll let you get at 
it any way you want to by cross examination or whatever. But 
I'm going to admit it, I'll overrule your objection with 
respect to those films." (Id., at 109; R. 4912). 
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In addition to the films of CJ5s rolling over, the 
trial court permitted plaintiffs' automotive safety 
consultant, Mr. Shaw, to introduce and testify regarding a 
chart purporting to show the so-called "roll over threshold" 
of a Commando. AMC/jeep objected to the chart for the reason 
that it was based entirely on information Mr. Shaw had 
obtained in testing CJ5s. (T., 10/24/83, at 671-679; R. 
2449-2457). The trial court overruled the objection and Mr. 
Shaw was permitted to utilize the exhibit to bolster his 
opinion as to the "roll over threshold" of the Commando. 
(.Id., at 687-694; R. 2466-2472). 
As even this brief overview of plaintiffs' 
demonstrative and expert testimony reveals, the sum and 
substance of plaintiffs' case against AMC/jeep was dependent 
upon the following syllogism: (1) Jeeps are unreasonably 
dangerous because they roll over too easily; (2) the Coramando 
is a Jeep; (3) therefore, the Commando is unreasonably 
dangerous. The trial court committed reversible error in 
permitting plaintiffs to present this theory to the jury 
because, as the record reflects: (a) the Commando is 
materially different from other Jeeps, particularly the CJ5, 
and (b) even assuming material similarity between the 
Commando and other Jeeps, the maneuvers depicted in 
plaintiffs' films bore no relation to the circumstances of 
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plaintiffs1 accident, and were so extraordinary in character 
that most vehicles would have rolled over under the 
conditions presented. The only thing demonstrated by 
plaintiffs1 films was that some of the CJ5s tested rolled 
over under the conditions depicted in the films — a fact 
that was not an issue in this lawsuit. 
The utilization of experimental evidence in a trial 
of this nature is fraught with danger. As one court recently 
put it: "The problem presented by the use of experiments is 
the danger of misleading the members of the jury who may 
attach exaggerated significance to the test. See generally. 
The fact that plaintiffs' films bear no relation to the 
circumstances of plaintiffs1 accident is shown most clearly 
in the following colloquy between plaintiffs' Mr. Anderson, 
who exhibited most of the films, and counsel for AMC/Jeep: 
Q. Is there any way you can help us 
as to what steering movements Mrs. 
Whitehead may have put into that vehicle 
at any point that we're talking about? 
A. No. ... 
Q. And is there anything that would 
say Mrs. Whitehead didn't put turning 
movement of more than 180 degrees into 
her steering, more or less? 
A. ... I couldn't say. 
Q. So whether the vehicle took an 
erratic path and was skidding, or what in 
the world it was doing through there, you 
can't help us, as far as your opinion? 
A. N o . . . . 
(T., 10/25/83, at 956-957; R. 2736-2737). In short, 
plaintiffs1 films were exhibited purely for the purpose of 
showing that "Jeeps" rolled over under the conditions 
depicted in the films — a fact that was not in issue in this 
lawsuit. 
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McCormick on Evidence, Section 202 (2d Ed. 1972)." Barnes 
V. General Motors Corp., 547 F. 2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1977). 
Because of this special danger, courts have developed a 
strict rule under which the use of experiments, like those 
offered by plaintiffs in this case, is limited to those 
situations where there is "a foundational showing ... that 
the tests were conducted under conditions substantially 
similar to actual conditions." Collins v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 
558 F. 2d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 1977). Courts consistently 
place "the burden ... upon the party offering evidence of 
out-of-court experiments ... to lay a proper foundation 
demonstrating a similarity of circumstances and conditions." 
Barnes, 547 F. 2d, at 27 7. See also Renfro Hosiery Mills Co. 
v. National Cash Register Co., 552 F. 2d 1061, 1065 (4th Cir. 
1977) (applying North Carolina law); Weaver v. Ford Motor 
Co., 382 F. Supp. 1068, 1072 (E.D. Pa. 1974) affd. 515 F. 2d 
506 (3rd Cir. 1975); Jones v. Stemco Manufacturing Co., Inc., 
624 P. 2d 1044, 1047 (Okla. 1981); Sanchez v. Haddix, 95 
Wash. 2d 593, 627 P. 2d 1312, 1314 (1981); Goodman v. Carson, 
84 Ariz. 177, 325 P. 2d 819, 821 (1958). 
Haynes v. American Motors Corporation, 691 F. 2d 
1268 (8th Cir. 1982)(applying Arkansas law), illustrates the 
trial court's error in admitting plaintiffs1 evidence of 
experiments performed on non-Commando vehicles in situations 
admittedly different from those which led to plaintiffs' 
accident. The plaintiff in Haynes sued the defendant for 
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injuries suffered when her Jeep CJ5 overturned on a rain-
slick highway. The jury returned a judgment in favor of the 
defendant and the plaintiff appealed on the ground that the 
trial court erred in refusing to allow her to introduce 
several television commercials depicting several models of 
"Jeeps" in off-road situations. It was the plaintiff's 
contention that these commercials constituted actionable 
misrepresentation because they led her to believe that her 
CJ5 would not roll over when subjected to the conditions of 
the accident. The Court of Appeals held that the films were 
properly excluded by the trial court/ stating: 
A number of the commercials dealt with 
the Jeep Cherokee, and thus had no 
relevance in this case, which involves a 
Jeep CJ-5. Those commercials dealing 
with the CJ-5 also had little relevance 
since they depicted the CJ-5 in off-the-
road settings, climbing steep hills and 
traversing rough terrain. In contrast, 
[the plaintiff's] accident occurred when 
her CJ-5 skidded off rain slick pavement 
and into a ditch. ... The trial court 
properly excluded these commercials, 
which would have served merely to confuse 
the issues before the jury and the court 
properly refused to allow plaintiffs' 
expert to comment on the commercials. 
691 F. 2d, at 1271. 
Plaintiffs' films in this case suffered from 
precisely the same defects as plaintiffs' films in Haynes — 
interestingly enough, plaintiffs' expert in Haynes was the 
same Robert Anderson who testified for plaintiffs in this 
case. Here, as in Haynes, the trial court should have 
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excluded plaintiffs' irrelevant films because they "served 
merely to confuse the issues before the jury." See also 
Barnes v. General Motors Corp., 547 F. 2d, at 277. 
These cases highlight the trial court's error in 
this case in permitting plaintiffs to make their case against 
AMC/Jeep with irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evidence and 
testimony. As in the cases discussed above, plaintiffs' 
evidence merely demonstrated the correctness of a fact not in 
dispute, i.e., that "Jeeps," in general, roll over in certain 
situations having no bearing on the particular circumstances 
of plaintiffs' accident. The films and opinions offered by 
plaintiffs' experts related to different vehicles subjected 
to artificial testing and should have been excluded because 
they bore no "substantial relation" to the actual vehicle and 
conditions involved in plaintiffs' accident, and were likely 
to be misunderstood by the jury and given exaggerated weight 
when the evidence was, in fact, of no probative value 
whatsoever. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BLOCKING 
AMC/JEEP1S EFFORT TO CROSS-EXAMINE 
PLAINTIFFS' EXPERTS. 
The trial court's error in admitting plaintiffs' 
irrelevant and prejudicial evidence alone would support this 
Court's reversal of the judgment in this case. This error 
was compounded, however, by the trial court's consistent 
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refusal to allow AMC/jeep to cross-examine plaintiffs1 ex-
perts in any meaningful way. 
The explicit point repeatedly made by plaintiffs1 
experts was that "Jeeps, " as a class of vehicles, overturned 
much more readily than other vehicles, and that non-Jeep 
vehicles would not have overturned under the circumstances of 
plaintiffs1 accident. (T., 10/20/83, at 558-560? 10/24/83, 
at 672-679, 688; 10/25/83, at 106-108, 894, 896, 897, 1039-
1040; R. 2331-2333, 2450-2457, 2466, 4909-4911, 2674, 2676, 
2818-2819). "Jeeps," as a generic class of vehicles, were 
consistently and explicitly represented as being unreasonably 
dangerous because of their alleged tendency to overturn "as 
distinguished from some other car." (_Id., at 558-559; R. 
2331-2332). Specifically, plaintiffs' automotive safety 
expert, Mr. Shaw, was allowed to testify, without foundation, 
that "there's no doubt that this vehicle is much more prone 
to roll over than some others." (T., 10/24/83, at 717; R. 
2495). Similarly, plaintiffs' Mr. Anderson testified without 
foundation that "Jeeps" handled more poorly as compared to 
other vehicles, (T., 10/25/83, at 896; R. 2676), and 
plaintiffs' Mr. Noettl testified that "it was very difficult 
to turn a passenger car over." (T., 10/26/83, at 1262; R. 
3039). There can be no doubt that plaintiffs' case depended 
on convincing the jury that the Commando, as a "Jeep," over-
turned in circumstances in which "some other car" would not 
have overturned. The trial court erred, however, in blocking 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AMC/Jeep's legitimate efforts to cross-examine plaintiffs' 
experts regarding the foundation for those opinions and to 
explore the relationship of that evidence to the circum-
stances of plaintiffs1 accident. 
Examples of the trial court's improper restriction 
of AMC/Jeep's right to cross examine plaintiffs' witnesses 
occur throughout the trial transcript. On cross-examination/ 
AMC/Jeep inquired of plaintiffs' Mr. Anderson whether he had 
"had occasion to investigate any accident where something 
besides a Jeep rolled over and hurt somebody." (rd., at 
1001; R. 2780). After the witness responded that he had, 
however, the trial court sustained plaintiffs' objection when 
AMC/Jeep attempted to inquire into such occasions. (Id.). 
The trial court also sustained plaintiffs' objections to 
questions regarding what other vehicles would do if subjected 
to the circumstances depicted in the films introduced through 
Mr. Anderson, (jLd.f at 1001-1005; R. 2780-2784), and whether 
other vehicles can be rolled on a level surface with driver 
input. (jtd../ at 1018; R. 2797). In each instance, the trial 
court ruled that the question was irrelevant; consequently, 
plaintiffs' theory that "Jeeps" are unreasonably dangerous 
when compared to "other vehicles" was allowed to go 
unchallenged because AMC/Jeep was not permitted to inquire 
how "other vehicles" would perform under the circumstances of 
plaintiffs' accident or under the CJ5 tests shown in Mr. 
Anderson's films. 
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AMC/Jeep's cross-examination of plaintiffs' Mr. 
Noettl was similarly restricted by the trial court. Mr. 
Noettl testified, on direct examination by plaintiffs1 
counsel, that "it was very difficult to turn a passenger car 
over." (T., 10/26/83, at 1262; R. 3039). To test Mr. 
Noettlfs knowledge about rolling passenger cars, AMC/Jeep 
asked him: "What experience have you had in trying to roll 
over a passenger vehicle." Plaintiffs objected and the trial 
court stated: "I don't want to get into testing all other 
kinds of vehicles, because we've got enough problems with 
one. vSo, I'm going to sustain the objection." (Id., at 
1266; R. 3043)(emphasis added). AMC/Jeep also asked Mr. 
Noettl whether he thought some other vehicle would have come 
but of plaintiffs' accident unscathed, but the trial court 
sustained plaintiffs' objection to that question as well. 
(Id., at 1275; R. 3052). 
The practical effect of the trial court's restric-
tion of appellants' right of cross-examination was to allow 
plaintiffs' theory of the case to go unchallenged. 
Plaintiffs' experts were allowed to testify repeatedly and 
without foundation that "Jeeps" performed poorly in 
comparison to other vehicles, yet AMC/Jeep was prohibited 
from exploring the basis for that comparison. The trial 
court's limitation of AMC/Jeep's cross-examination of 
plaintiffs' experts was, therefore, reversible error. 
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In State v, Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 
(1953), this Court reversed the judgment of the trial court 
based, in part, on the trial court's erroneous limitation on 
cross-examination, stating that "[t]here is no other 
instrument so well adapted to discovery of the truth as 
cross-examination, and so long as it tends to disclose the 
truth it should never be curtailed or limited." 265 P. 2d, 
at 637. "It is fundamental that once a witness testifies as 
an expert, he subjects himself to the most rigid kind of 
cross-examination, including searching questions concerning 
his qualifications, the extent of his knowledge, and the 
basis of his opinion", Ross v. Colorado National Bank of 
Denver, 170 Colo. 436, 463 P. 2d 882, 887 (1969), and "unduly 
harsh limitation on cross-examination can amount to 
prejudicial error." N.V. Maatschappij Voor Industriele 
Waarden v. A.0. Smith Corp., 590 F. 2d 415, 421 (2nd Cir. 
1978). Accord In re Compensation of Bales, 294 Or. 224, 656 
P. 2d 300, 306 n.4 (1982); Samuel v. Vanderheiden, 277 Or. 
239, 560 P. 2d 636, 639 (1977); Bott v. Wendler, 203 Kan. 
212, 453 P. 2d 100 (1969); Hope v. Arrowhead and Puritas 
Waters, Inc., 344 P. 2d 428, 433 (Cal. App. 1959); Brazee v. 
Morris, 65 Ariz. 291, 179 P. 2d 442, 444 (1947). 
The recent case of Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 
580 P. 2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978), has particular significance when 
compared to the facts in this case. The plaintiff in 
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Todorovich was injured while driving an automobile manufac-
tured by the defendant and the plaintiff's theory was that he 
was injured due to a defectively designed seat in the 
automobile. At trial, the plaintiff's expert testified with 
respect to the failure of the automobile seat and to alterna-
tive safer designs and methods of construction. When the 
defendant attempted to inquire on cross-examination about 
federal seat design standards, however, the line of questions 
was blocked by the trial court. On appeal, the Wyoming 
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, in 
part on the basis of the trial court's limitation of the 
defendant's cross-examination, stating: 
At this point in the trial counsel for 
Chrysler was confronted with the problem 
of cross-examination of an expert witness 
for the plaintiff who had stated his 
opinion as to the proper method of 
designing and manufacturing the part that 
failed. ... Fairness to Chrysler in such 
a situation demands that it be afforded 
reasonable opportunity to test by search-
ing questions the knowledge, competency 
and qualifications of such an expert 
witness. ... Having offered his expert 
opinion the expert witness exposes him-
self to interrogation which ordinarily 
would have no place in the cross-examina-
tion of a factual witness, but the expert 
exposes himself to the most searching 
kind of investigation into his qualifica-
tions, the extent of his knowledge and 
the reasons for his opinion, including 
the facts and oth£r matter upon which it 
is based. 
580 P.2d, at 1133 (emphasis added). 
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The facts in this case closely parallel the facts 
in Todorovich. Plaintiffs' experts repeatedly expressed 
their opinion that "Jeeps" rolled over in situations where 
other automobiles would not. Yet, in virtually every 
instance where AMC/Jeep attempted to cross-examine on this 
point, the trial court sustained plaintiffs' objections. 
AMC/Jeep's right to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts was 
erroneously curtailed by the trial court and its judgment 
should accordingly be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING 
SUBSTANTIAL PORTIONS OF 
AMC/JEEP'S EVIDENCE. 
The first two Points in this brief illustrate the 
unfair advantage accorded plaintiffs by the trial court in 
permitting them to introduce irrelevant and unduly prejudi-
cial evidence and then blocking AMC/Jeep's cross-examination 
with respect to that evidence. Compounding those errors and 
removing any vestige of fundamental fairness from the procee-
dings, however, the trial court then systematically barred 
the introduction by AMC/Jeep of virtually all of its 
demonstrative evidence offered to rebut the unfounded im-
plications raised by plaintiffs' experts. 
The trial court's limitation of AMC/Jeep's evidence 
is as startling as it is unprecedented. Before AMC/Jeep even 
called its first engineering expert, the trial court heard, 
in chambers, plaintiffs' objections to two films that would 
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be offered in conjunction with that expert's testimony. 
AMC/Jeep's expert, Edward Heitzman, whose extensive ex-
perience in the field of automotive safety and design made 
him singularly qualified to testify regarding the comparisons 
and tests relied upon so heavily by plaintiffs, intended to 
rebut plaintiffs1 evidence, suggesting that the Commando is 
unsafe because CJ5s rolled over in plaintiffs' films, by 
exhibiting films of a Jeep CJ5 undergoing certain maneuvers 
and remaining upright. The purpose of the films was to 
illustrate Mr. Heitzman's testimony: (1) that the tests 
depicted in plaintiffs' films did not represent realistic 
emergency driving conditions; (2) that the mechanically 
induced conditions reflected in plaintiffs' films would not 
be duplicated by a human driver; and (3) that the CJ5 is in 
fact a stable vehicle which can successfully negotiate 
realistic emergency conditions. When questioned by the trial 
court as to the materiality of the films, counsel for 
AMC/Jeep responded: 
The materiality, your Honor, is that in 
the course of this trial, the plaintiffs 
have challenged the handling qualities of 
the Jeep CJ5. And they say that it's an 
unstable vehicle. And we think that this 
test demonstrates graphically to the jury 
that it's not an unstable vehicle, it can 
do very vigorous maneuvers and do that 
maneuver successfully. 
(Ijd., at 1565; R. 3347). AMC/Jeep explained that it was not 
admitting that tests of the CJ5 were relevant to the issue of 
the Commando's characteristics, but rather offered the tests 
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to rebut evidence suggesting that the CJ5 was an unstable 
vehicle. (ixl., at 1566; R. 3348).5 The trial court 
ruled that defendants1 films of the CJ5 were not admissible, 
however. (id.., at 1571; R. 3353). Mr. Heitzman1 s second 
film demonstrated that virtually any vehicle will roll over 
when subjected to the conditions depicted in plaintiffs' 
films. 
Stripped of his demonstrative evidence, Mr. 
Heitzman nevertheless took the witness stand, (id., at 1577; 
R. 3359), and through his testimony attempted to rebut plain-
tiffs' films. Mr. Heitzman's testimony was severely and 
unquestionably undermined, however, by his inability to 
demonstrate his opinions with his own CJ5 films. 
AMC/Jeep next attempted to rebut the testimony of 
plaintiffs' expert with respect to plaintiffs' film showing a 
Commando, equipped with "outriggers", undergoing certain 
tests, and Mr. Anderson's testimony for the plaintiffs that, 
but for the outriggers, the Commando in the film would have 
rolled over. (T., 10/28/83, 918-926; R. 2698-2706). Mr. 
Heitzman testified that, in his opinion, Mr. Anderson's film 
If one party is permitted to introduce irrelevant and 
therefore inadmissible evidence, the general rule "is that 
the opponent may reply with similar evidence whenever it is 
needed for removing an unfair prejudice which might otherwise 
have ensued from the original evidence." Wigmore on 
Evidence, Section 15, pp. 304-307. See also, Dewey "v. Funk, 
211 Kan. 54, 505 P.2d 722, 724-726 (1973); Wynn v. Sundquist, 
485 P.2d 1085, 1090-1091 (Or. 1971); Mills v. Memphis Sales 
Manufacturing Co. , 251 F. Supp. 458, 460 (N.D. Miss". 1966). 
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of the specially equipped Commando did not illustrate situa-
tions in which the Commando would have rolled. An expert's 
eye and ear can discern when a vehicle equipped with outrig-
gers would have rolled over but for the outriggers, (id., 
1744; R. 3527), and Mr. Heitzman testified that, in fact, the 
Commando shown in Mr. Anderson's film would not have rolled 
over had the outriggers not been attached. (T., 10/28/83, 
1674-1676; R. 3457-3459). 
The basis for Mr. Heitzman's opinion in this regard 
was the fact that the outriggers on plaintiffs' Commando were 
set too low, preventing that vehicle from even approaching a 
situation in which actual roll-over would have occurred. To 
demonstrate Mr. Heitzman's opinion in this regard, AMC/jeep 
attempted to introduce a film of its own showing certain 
vehicles undergoing test maneuvers with outriggers attached, 
more appropriately, far enough off the ground so that when 
the roll-over was induced the viewer could see quite clearly 
the point at which the outriggers actually prevented the 
roll-over from occurring. The introduction of this film was 
likewise blocked by the trial court, however, in spite of the 
fact that Mr. Heitzman was later cross-examined extensively 
with respect to his judgment that plaintiffs' film did not 
demonstrate a Commando rolling over, (Icl., 1824; R. 3607), 
and Mr. Heitzman's ability to respond to such cross-
examination was seriously undermined by the trial court's 
exclusion of the outrigger film. 
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AMC/Jeep also intended to utilize the outrigger 
film to rebut plaintiffs1 evidence that "Jeeps" are more 
likely to roll over in emergency situations than "other 
vehicles." AMC/Jeep especially needed this film to 
illustrate Mr. Heitzman1s point that many vehicles will roll 
over when subjected to the mechanically induced tests 
illustrated in plaintiffs1 films. Indeed, it was absolutely 
essential to AMC/Jeep's defense of plaintiffs' products 
liability claim that it be permitted to show that the 
Commando, in fact, compared favorably to other vehicles. The 
film was excluded by the trial court, however, "because it's 
irrelevant, and it's irrelevant because they involve other 
vehicles which the jury would have to take into consideration 
as to how it was done, the comparisons, the whole works." 
(Id., 1746-1747, 1750; R. 3529-3530, 3533). The trial court 
thus refused to permit Mr. Heitzman to rebut the testimony of 
plaintiffs' experts with his own films even though 
plaintiffs' experts had been allowed to illustrate their 
opinions with extremely graphic and prejudicial films showing 
clothed dummies being thrown from vehicles during 
mechanically induced maneuvers incapable of being duplicated 
by human beings in realistic emergency situations. The 
distinct impression left with the jury, later capitalized on 
by opposing counsel during closing argument, was that 
AMC/Jeep did not have any demonstrative evidence to rebut or 
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even answer the several films presented by plaintiffs' 
experts. 
AMC/Jeep made one last attempt to present its case 
by calling Dr. Charles Warner, a mechanical engineer and 
consultant, to testify about the motion of the accident 
vehicle and of plaintiffs therein during the course of the 
accident made the basis of this lawsuit, and to give an 
opinion regarding the design of the Commando. (T., 10/28/83, 
1829; R. 3612). Specifically, it was Dr. Warner's opinion 
that the Commando was not defective and that its design did 
not cause plaintiffs' accident or injuries. (1^., at 1873-
1874; R. 3656-3657). 
Dr. Warner had studied the actual accident vehicle 
and the accident scene extensively and offered his opinion as 
to the probable movement of the Commando during the course of 
plaintiffs' accident. (T., 10/31/83, 1941-1954; R. 3728-
3741). In addition, Dr. Warner had also obtained exemplar 
vehicles — a Commando and an Oldsmobile similar to the 
automobile driven by defendant Larry Anderson which struck 
plaintiffs' Commando from the rear — and had performed 
certain tests with those vehicles in an attempt to 
reconstruct plaintiffs' accident. (Ld., at 1937-1938; R. 
3724-3725). 
A critical aspect of Dr. Warner's testimony was his 
opinion regarding the movement of plaintiffs' bodies during 
the course of the accident. It was Dr. Warner's opinion that 
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plaintiffs' movement within the vehicle during the course of 
the accident, rather than the fact that the vehicle happened 
to be a Commando, actually caused plaintiff Steven 
Whitehead's injury. (.Id., 1957-1967; R. 3744-3754). Dr. 
Warner had taken a series of photographs depicting human 
beings sitting in the exemplar vehicle, a Commando, and 
positioning themselves as Dr. Warner testified plaintiffs 
were most probably positioned during the course of the 
accident. The photographs were essential to the jury's 
understanding of Dr. Warner's testimony. The trial court 
nevertheless excluded the photographs on the basis "that they 
have no probative value, that the probative value is limited 
at least because of the photographs not being representative 
of just what did happen to the vehicles." (rd., at 1967; R. 
3754). Of course, this was the same objection made by 
AMC/Jeep with respect to virtually all of plaintiffs' 
demonstrative evidence, but it was only when AMC/Jeep at-
tempted to present its own case that the trial court suddenly 
became concerned that the demonstrative evidence represent 
"just what did happen to the vehicles." (See also Id., at 
2009-2011; R. 3797-3799). 
Dr. Warner was also prepared to demonstrate his 
testimony regarding occupant movement and damage during a 
rollover with a film showing several vehicles rolling over. 
(Ixi., at 1985; R. 3773). The trial court excluded this film 
as well. (Id., at 1986; R. 3774). 
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Dr^ Warner also testified that plaintiffs' injuries 
were due, in part, to the fact that their Commando had been 
involved in a prior accident which had compromised the in-
tegrity of the Commando's passenger compartment and had 
aggravated the injuries suffered by plaintiffs. (_Id., at 
2024; R. 3812). Dr. Warner had personally examined the 
accident vehicle before reaching this conclusion and had, 
thereafter, prepared an exhibit to demonstrate his testimony 
in this regard. The trial court sustained plaintiffs' objec-
tion to this exhibit as well. (j[d., at 2026; R. 3814). 
AMC/Jeep's final attempt to present demonstrative 
evidence to the jury was in the form of a film prepared by 
Dr. Warner of an exemplar vehicle, a Commando, undergoing 
certain tests and maneuvers with outriggers attached. The 
film had obvious probative value and would have been used to 
rebut the testimony elicited by plaintiffs in connection with 
the film of their exemplar. (id., at 1973; R. 3781). The 
trial court excluded the defendants' film, however, stating 
only that "I believe that [it] is not probative of any issues 
except perhaps the test which was made ...." (I_d., 1986; R. 
3774). The trial court's statement is simply inexplicable in 
light of the fact that plaintiffs had previously been allowed 
to introduce a film of their own exemplar Commando. 
The foregoing catalogue of the trial court's exclu-
sion of virtually all of AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence 
illustrates plainly the unfair advantage granted by the trial 
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court to the plaintiffs in this case. Not only were plain-
tiffs permitted to introduce irrelevant and inflammatory 
demonstrative evidence, not only was AMC/Jeep precluded by 
the trial court from cross-examining plaintiffs' witnesses 
with respect to that evidence, but also when AMC/Jeep at-
tempted to rebut plaintiffs' case it was forced to do so 
without the aid of its films and other demonstrative 
evidence. 
^• AMC/Jeep's Demonstrative Evidence Should have 
been Admitted to Rebut Plaintiffs' Irrelevant 
Evidence. 
The limitations imposed by the trial court on the 
testimony of AMC/Jeep's experts was prejudicial error requir-
ing reversal of the judgment against AMC/Jeep. Virtually all 
of AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence would have been used to 
rebut the theory, never proven, but so graphically implied by 
plaintiffs' films and the trial court's erroneous admission 
thereof: that all "Jeeps" are the same, that "Jeeps," as a 
generic type of vehicle, roll over much more frequently than 
other vehicles, and that the Commando is consequently a 
defective vehicle. AMC/Jeep's films would have shown (1) 
that Jeeps remain upright when subjected to realistic 
emergency situations; (2) that plaintiffs' film of their 
exemplar Commando did not illustrate a roll-over of that 
vehicle; and (3) that plaintiffs' tests of CJ5s undergoing 
mechanically induced maneuvers were unrealistic and 
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misleading in that they demonstrated test maneuvers few 
vehicles could perform successfully. The admission of 
AMC/Jeepfs films was essential if AMC/Jeep was to have any 
hope of rebutting the evidence that had erroneously been 
admitted by the trial court during plaintiffs1 case in chief. 
AMC/Jeep's rebuttal evidence was admissible under 
the rule, stated at note 5, supra, that if one party is 
permitted to introduce irrelevant and, therefore, inadmis-
sible evidence, his opponent may reply with similar evidence 
to remove any prejudice which might have ensued from the 
original evidence. The exclusion of defendants' films was, 
therefore, reversible error. 
In Walker v. Trico Manufacturing Company, Inc., 487 
F. 2d 595 (7th Cir. 1973), cert, denied 415 U.S. 978 (1974), 
the plaintiff sued the defendant, on a strict liability 
theory, for an injury incurred when her hand was crushed in a 
machine manufactured by the defendant. As in this case, the 
plaintiff presented evidence that the defendant's machine was 
more dangerous than other such machines and the defendant 
presented contrary evidence that its machine met the stan-
dards of the industry. On appeal the Seventh Circuit found 
the admission of the defendant's evidence proper on the 
ground that "[t]he plaintiff opened this matter during the 
presentation of her case in chief. Having done so, she 
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cannot complain of [defendant's] attempt at rebuttal." 487 
F. 2d, at 600. 
The settled rule that "[a] party eliciting evidence 
cannot object to the same kind of evidence introduced on 
behalf of the other party," Shields v. Campbell, 277 Or. 71, 
559 P. 2d 1275 (1977), has been expressed in many contexts 
substantially similar to this case. The plaintiff in C.F. 
Church v. Golden, 429 P. 2d 771 (Okla. 1967), for example, 
was burned when his toilet seat, manufactured by the defen-
dant, caught on fire. It was the plaintiff's theory that the 
toilet seat was defectively designed making it highly flam-
mable and the plaintiff's experts testified regarding experi-
ments performed on similar toilet seats. The defendant's 
experts then testified about similar experiments which they 
had performed and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
defendant. The plaintiff appealed on the ground that the 
experiments performed by the defendants' experts should not 
have been admitted. The Oklahoma Supreme Court disagreed, 
however, stating: 
Plaintiffs entire case was predicated on 
the theory that the covering on the 
toilet in question contained a highly 
inflammable chemical known as cellulose 
nitrate. He offered testimony of experts 
regarding experiments made in substan-
tially the same manner as those made by 
defendant's experts. Under such cir-
cumstances it was not error to admit the 
evidence of defendant's experts on the 
point. 
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429 P. 2d, at 775. See also Nordstrom v. White Metal Rolling 
and Stamping Corp., 75 Wash. 2d 629, 453 P. 2d 619 (1969); 
Leger Construction, Inc. v. Roberts, Inc., 550 P. 2d 212, 
214-215 (Utah 1976) . 
In each of the cases cited above, as in this case, 
the plaintiff introduced expert testimony and demonstrative 
evidence tending to prove his theory that the defendant's 
product was defective, and in each of these cases the appel-
late court found that the defendant must be permitted to 
rebut such evidence by introducing similar tests of his own. 
The common sense rule enunciated in these cases underscores 
AMC/Jeep's argument that its tests of CJ5s and of the ex-
emplar Commando, as well as all of its other demonstrative 
evidence, should not have been excluded by the trial court 
once plaintiffs had opened the door to such testimony in 
their own case in chief. 
B. AMC/Jeep's Demonstrative Evidence was Relevant 
to Show the State-of-the-Art. 
Even had plaintiffs not "opened the door" to the 
issue of industry standards with respect to roll-over charac-
teristics, AMC/Jeepfs evidence was admissible under settled 
principles of products liability law. As the Court stated in 
Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F. 2d 442, 447 (10th Cir. 
1976): n[T]here is 'general1 agreement that to prove 
liability under Section 402A [Restatement (Second) of Torts] 
the plaintiff must show that the product was dangerous beyond 
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the expectation of the ordinary customer. State-of-art 
evidence helps to determine the expectation of the ordinary 
consumer. A consumer would not expect a Model T to have the 
safety features which are incorporated in automobiles today." 
This Court adopted Section 402A, Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel 
Co., 601 P. 2d 152 (Utah 1979), and courts in other states 
that have adopted this standard agree that "state-of-the-art" 
or "industry standards" evidence is relevant in design defect 
cases like this one. The court in Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. 
v. Day, 594 P. 2d 38 (Alaska 1979) cert, denied 454 U.S. 894 
(1981), stated, for example, that "[w]hile not, strictly 
speaking, a defense in a products liability action, state of 
the art may be considered in determining whether a product is 
defective." 594 P. 2d, at 45. See Traynor, The Ways and 
Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn. 
L. Rev. 363, 367, 370 (1967). 
Similarly, in Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 
F. 2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1982), a products liability case 
Some courts exclude evidence of the state of the art in 
manufacturing defect cases because the plaintiff in such 
cases need only show that the product does not conform to the 
manufacturer's specifications to prove it is defective. See 
Singleton v. International Harvester Co., 685 F. 2d 112, 115 
(4th Cir. 1981). When the issue is a defect in design, 
however, state of the art evidence is generally held to be 
admissible. Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F. 2d 
1192, 1196 (4th Cir. 1982); Raney v. Honeywell, Inc., 540 F. 
2d 932 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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under Section 402A, the plaintiffs suffered personal injuries 
when their mobile home, manufactured by the defendant, burst 
into flames. The plaintiffs in Reed, like plaintiffs in this 
case, offered evidence that their motor home was more 
dangerous than motor homes manufactured by other companies. 
The defendant then sought to rebut this evidence, as AMC/Jeep 
did in this case, by offering evidence that its motor home 
was as safe as other motor homes. The defendant's state-of-
the-art evidence was admitted by the trial court, and the 
plaintiffs appealed after the jury returned a verdict against 
them. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant's state-
of-the-art evidence was properly admitted stating: 
[T]he majority rule is that state of the 
art evidence is admissible in design 
defect cases. ... Section 402A and the 
South Carolina Courts require the plain-
tiff to show both that the product is 
defective and that it is 'unreasonably 
dangerous to the consumer or user given 
the conditions and circumstances that 
foreseeably attend use of the product.' 
The majority of courts have found in 
design defect cases, as opposed to 
manufacturing defect cases, that state of 
the art and industry standards are 
relevant to show both the reasonableness 
of the design and that the product was 
dangerous beyond the expectations of the 
ordinary consumer. 
697 F. 2d, at 1196 (citations omitted). See Porter v. 
American Optical Corp., 641 F. 2d 1123, 1140 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(applying Louisiana law), cert, denied 454 U.S. 1109 (1981); 
Hohlenkamp v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 134 Ariz. 208, 655 P. 
2d 32, 36 (1932) . 
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This case, like the cases cited above, is a design 
defect case. This Court, like the courts quoted above, has 
adopted Section 402A requiring the plaintiff to prove that 
the product in question is both defective and unreasonably 
dangerous. The rule stated in these cases is, therefore, 
persuasive, and the trial court's exclusion of all AMC/Jeep 
evidence relating to the state-of-the-art was erroneous both 
because such evidence would have rebutted similar evidence 
presented by plaintiffs and because such evidence was inde-
pendently relevant to AMC/Jeep's' defense that the Commando 
in question was neither defectively designed nor unreasonably 
dangerous. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ORDER 
A MISTRIAL BASED ON IMPROPER CLOSING 
ARGUMENTS MADE BY OPPOSING COUNSEL. 
As reflected in the preceding sections of this 
Brief, the trial court blocked virtually every attempt by 
AMC/Jeep to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts and to rebut 
the evidence offered by those experts tending to suggest that 
the Commando in this case was defective and unreasonably 
dangerous resulting in the injuries sustained by plaintiffs. 
Without doubt, AMC/Jeep possessed and offered the demonstra-
tive evidence to rebut the testimony of plaintiffs' experts, 
but the trial court excluded virtually all that evidence on 
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the objection of opposing counsel. It was, therefore, im-
proper and prejudicial for opposing counsel to argue during 
closing arguments to the jury: (1) that AMC/Jeep had "No 
positive proof. None at all." (T. 11/3/83, at 32; R. 4582); 
(2) that "They [AMC/Jeep] bring no evidence, none at all," 
(.id., at 33; R. 4583), and (3) that AMC/Jeep's experts failed 
to bring "an ounce of engineering data." (^ Id., at 35; R. 
4585). Opposing counsel (in this instance, counsel for Larry 
Anderson, building upon the improper arguments of plaintiffs' 
counsel) reached the height of impropriety when he made the 
following statement to the jury: 
Why didn't Jeep, having all of the test 
data of the plaintiff's experts, knowing 
exactly what they had done, even to the 
height of the outriggers off the ground; 
why didn't they go out and test a 
Commando, put some outriggers on there 
and go do some testing of their own? Why 
didn't they come in here and tell you, 
'We have done the same kind of tests that 
the plaintiffs did, we have put the same 
number of degrees of steer in on a 
Commando, and that vehicle wouldn't turn 
over; why didn't they do that? I'll tell 
you why: They are afraid to do it. They 
didn't dare do it. Because they knew 
that Commando would turn over. 
(Id.., at 109; R. 4659). Of course, AMC/Jeep had put outrig-
gers on a Commando and offered films of the tests conducted 
on that Commando, but those films were excluded by the trial 
court on the basis of objections from opposing counsel. 
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It requires no authority to establish that lawyers 
have a duty to present their case to a jury without misstat-
ing material facts or relying on facts not in evidence. 
Professional conduct, as well as fundamental notions of fair 
play and justice, require that counsel refrain from the type 
of misrepresentation made by opposing counsel in this case. 
The court in State v. Dudley, 104 Idaho 849, 664 P. 2d 277, 
280 (Idaho App. 1983), recently quoted with approval the 
following statement of the rule from the American Bar 
Association Standards, The Defense Function Section 7.8(a) 
(1971): 
In closing argument to the jury the 
lawyer may argue all reasonable in-
ferences from the evidence in the record. 
It is unprofessional conduct for a lawyer 
intentionally to misstate the evidence or 
mislead the jury as to the inferences it 
may draw. 
There are often circumstances in which 
counsel may be entitled to argue to the 
jury that they should draw an inference 
adverse to the prosecution as the result 
of its failure to bring forth some par-
ticular item of evidence or to call as a 
witness someone who has a special rela-
tion to the facts of the case. But it is 
a form of misrepresentation, and there-
fore improper, for counsel to argue that 
the evidence was not presented because it 
had been excluded by the court or is 
inadmissible. A lawyer who has success-
fully urged the court to exclude evidence 
should not be allowed to point to the 
absence of that evidence to create an 
inference that it does not exist. 
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(Emphasis added); see also Pritchard v. State, 673 P. 2d 29i; 
294 n.l (Alaska App. 1983) (Singleton, J.# dissenting); Rizzo 
v. United States, 304 F. 2d 810, 829 (8th Cir. 1962). 
That rule is directly applicable here. Opposing 
counsel knew that AMC/Jeep had offered a film showing a 
Commando undergoing extreme turning maneuvers and not rolling 
over. Counsel also knew that AMC/Jeep had offered extensive 
additional demonstrative evidence to support its case. 
Counsel knew this because they had viewed such evidence in 
chambers at the time it was excluded by the trial court at 
their instance. It was, therefore, misleading and plainly 
improper to argue that AMC/Jeep failed to bring "an ounce of 
engineering data" or that AMC/Jeep was "afraid" to offer such 
evidence. 
In the context of this trial, opposing counsels1 
closing arguments were extremely prejudicial. As this Court 
recently stated: "The proper remedy for prejudicial attorney 
misconduct is to order a new trial." Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 
P. 2d 730, 734 (Utah 1982). This is precisely the remedy 
sought by AMC/Jeep in this appeal. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING ALL 
EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE PRESENCE OF 
AND PLAINTIFFS1 FAILURE TO UTILIZE 
AVAILABLE SEAT BELTS. 
It is undisputed that plaintiffs' Commando was 
equipped with seat belts and that plaintiffs were not wearing 
their seat belts at the time of the accident. Prior to 
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trial, however, plaintiffs submitted a Motion in Limine "to 
preclude the defendants or their witnesses or attorneys from 
mentioning the subject of seat belts or the use or nonuse of 
seatbelts at the trial of this case." (R. 1274-1294). 
AMC/Jeep submitted an opposing memorandum, (R. 1425-1464), 
and the trial court heard argument on the question of the 
admissibility of seat belt evidence, in various contexts, 
throughout the trial. In each instance, however, AMC/Jeep 
was precluded from introducing evidence on the availability 
and plaintiffs1 non-use of their seat belts. 
Initially, the trial court ruled that, at least for 
opening statements, neither party could refer "to 'seat 
belts' or the availability, or the lack thereof, or the lack 
of use thereof." (T., Abstracts from Transcript of Trial, 
10/18/83, at 156; R. 4959). Later that same day, and in the 
face of plaintiffs' basic theory that the Commando was defec-
tively designed by AMC/Jeep and was, therefore, unreasonably 
dangerous, the trial court ruled that the fact that plain-
tiffs had access to seat belts would not be admitted to show 
that the Commando was properly designed. (T., 10/18/83, at 
12; R. 1763). 
The trial court subsequently compounded its er-
roneous exclusion of seat belt evidence, however, when it 
ruled that AMC/Jeep could not cross-examine plaintiffs' 
experts with respect to the presence of seat belts in the 
accident vehicle, even though those experts were testifying 
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that the Commando was an unsafe vehicle. (T., Abstracts from 
Transcript of Trial, 10/24/83, at 88; R. 4891). Finally, a 
proffer was made to the trial court by AMC/Jeep's expert 
witness, Dr. Warner, that had plaintiff Steven Whitehead 
"been using the seat belt in all probability he would not 
have received the spinal injury that he did receive." (T., 
10/31/83, at 2018; R. 3806). The trial court, nevertheless, 
ruled that no evidence regarding seat belts would be admitted 
in the trial, summarizing the basis for its ruling as 
follows: 
"[T]o speculate what the seat belt might 
have done in this type of situation is 
just something that the jury ought not 
to, and they will not have, under my 
ruling, the obligation to consider. ... 
Therefore, there will be no more evidence 
in this case with regard to seat belts. 
I want everybody to leave it alone, and 
we'll go from there." 
(.Id., at 2019-2020; R. 3807-3808). The trial courtf s exclu-
sion of all evidence relating to the presence of and plain-
tiffs' failure to utilize seat belts was prejudicial error. 
A
• Plaintiffs* Failure to Utilize Available Seat 
Belts Contributed to their Injuries, and 
Constituted a Failure to Mitigate their 
Damages. 
The trial court's exclusion of any evidence relat-
ing to plaintiffs' failure to utilize available seat belts 
was error. Although this Court has yet to rule on the issue, 
the so-called "seat belt defense" has been accepted in a 
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substantial number of jurisdictions that have addressed the 
question. 
In Utah, it is proper for the jury to consider the 
faults of both plaintiff and defendant when they "have united 
as concurrent proximate causes of an injury11 in strict 
liability cases. Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P. 2d 
1301, 1303 (1981). AMC/Jeep's experts were prepared to 
testify that had plaintiff Steven Whitehead been wearing his 
seat belt at the time of the accident "he would not have 
received the spinal injury that he did receive." (T., 
10/31/83, at 2018; R. 3806). AMC/jeep would have offered 
further evidence that plaintiffs1 failure to utilize the 
available seat belts was a breach of plaintiffs1 duty "to use 
the degree of care which an ordinary, reasonable, and prudent 
person would have observed for his own safety under the 
circumstances." Lindquist v. Kennecott Copper Company, Inc., 
30 Utah 2d 262, 516 P. 2d 1182, 1185 (1973). 
It is difficult to deny that, in the current 
climate of consumer awareness and in light of repeated 
government and industry-sponsored campaigns urging citizens 
to "buckle up for safety," a reasonably prudent person acts 
unreasonably when he fails to use an available seat belt 
before venturing onto the highways. One commentator has 
noted the objective fact that "the use of seat belts would 
reduce serious injuries resulting from automobile accidents 
by thirty-three percent, and could save up to twelve thousand 
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lives annually." Note, The Seat Belt Defense: A 
Comprehensive Guide for the Trial Lawyer and Suggested 
Approach for the Courts, 56 Notre Dame Lawyer 272, 281 
(1980). The court in the seminal case of Bentzler v. Braun, 
34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W. 2d 626, 640 (1967), put it this way: 
"On the basis of ... experience, and as a matter of common 
knowledge, an occupant of an automobile either knows or 
should know of the additional safety factor produced by the 
use of seat belts." 
From the common sense proposition that it may be 
unreasonable for one to fail to use available seat belts, it 
is properly within the jury's purview to determine whether 
the plaintiff in a particular case has met his duty of due 
care. As the court noted in Mount v. McClellan, 91 Ill.App. 
2d 1, 234 N.E. 2d 329, 331 (1968): 
The use, or non-use of seat belts, and 
expert testimony, if any, in relation 
thereto, is a circumstance which the 
trier of facts may consider, together 
with all other facts in evidence, in 
arriving at its conclusion as to whether 
the plaintiff has exercised due care, not 
only to avoid injury to himself, but to 
mitigate any injury he would likely 
sustain. 
See also Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y. 2d 444, 323 N.E. 2d 164, 
167 (1974). Under these settled principles, and under the 
rule announced by this Court in Mulherin, the trial court 
should have admitted AMC/Jeep's evidence and expert testimony 
to prove that plaintiff Steven Whitehead's failure to utilize 
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his seat belt "united" with any fault of AMC/Jeep "as concur-
rent and proximate causes of" his injury. 
Courts which do not subscribe to this Court's view, 
as expressed in Mulherin, that comparative fault principles 
may apply to a strict products liability case, prefer to 
classify a plaintiff's failure to utilize seat belts as a 
breach of the duty to mitigate damages. The language most 
often quoted in this regard is as follows: 
As Prosser has indicated, the plaintiff's 
duty to mitigate his damages is equiv-
alent to the doctrine of avoidable conse-
quences, which precludes recovery for any 
damages which could have been eliminated 
by reasonable conduct on the part of the 
plaintiff (Prosser, Torts [4th ed.J, 
Section 65, pp. 422-424). Traditionally 
both of these concepts have been applied 
only to postaccident conduct, such as a 
plaintiff's failure to obtain medical 
treatment after he has sustained an 
injury. To do otherwise, it has been 
argued, would impose a preaccident 
obligation upon the plaintiff and would 
deny him the right to assume the due care 
of others (Kleist, Seat Belt Defense — 
An Exercise in Sophistry, 18 Hastings 
L.J. 613, 616). We concede that the 
opportunity to mitigate damages prior to 
the occurrence of an accident does not 
ordinarily arise, and that the 
chronological distinction, on which the 
concept of mitigation of damages rests, 
is justified in most cases. However, in 
our opinion, the seat belt affords the 
automobile occupant an unusual and or-
dinarily unavailable means by which he or 
she may minimize his or her damages prior 
to the accident. Highway safety has 
become a national concern; we are told to 
drive defensively and to 'watch out for 
the other driver'. When an automobile 
occupant may readily protect himself, at 
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least partially, from the consequences of 
a collision, we think that the burden of 
buckling an available seat belt may, 
under the facts of the particular case, 
be found by the jury to be less than the 
likelihood of injury when multiplied by 
its accompanying severity* 
Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E. 2d, at 168. This view is supported 
by Section 465, comment c, Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
dealing with the causal relation between harm and plaintiff's 
fault, which states that damages may be apportioned 
where the antecedent negligence of the 
plaintiff is found not to contribute in 
any way to the original accident or 
injury, but to be a substantial con-
tributing factor in increasing the harm 
which ensues. There must of course be 
satisfactory evidence to support such a 
finding, and the court may properly 
refuse to permit the apportionment on the 
basis of mere speculation. 
Pursuant to this rule, courts will admit evidence 
of nonuse of seatbelts when the defendant can demonstrate, by 
competent and satisfactory evidence, the extent that the 
plaintiff's injuries could have been avoided by wearing a 
seat belt. Garrett v. Desa Industries, Inc., 705 F. 2d 721, 
725 (4th Cir. 1983); Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 
445 F. Supp 1368, 1372-1373 (E.D. Va. 1978); Insurance 
Company of North America v. Pasakarnis, 52 U.S.L.W. 2598 
(Florida Supreme Court; April 12, 1984); Spier v. Barker, 
363 N.E. 2d, at 166. 
Whether viewed as a species of comparative fault 
under Mulherin or as a failure to mitigate damages, the jury 
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in this case should have been permitted to consider the fact 
of plaintiffs' failure to utilize available seat belts. 
Acceptance of the so-called "seat belt defense" will not 
undermine in any way the rights of plaintiffs to recover for 
injuries caused them by others. The defense is not a bar to 
recovery in and of itself. The burden remains on the 
defendant to prove, first, that it was unreasonable for the 
plaintiff not to use a seat belt, and, second, that the 
plaintiff would not have received some or all of his injuries 
had he used the seat belt. Only if AMC/Jeep were able to 
convince the jury of both prongs of its defense would the 
jury have reduced plaintiff Steven Whitehead's recovery by an 
appropriate amount. 
B. The Jury Should have been Permitted to 
Consider the Fact that the Commando was 
Equipped with Seat Belts. 
AMC/Jeep was also denied any opportunity to present 
evidence of the simple fact that the Commando in this case 
was equipped with seat belts. Such evidence would have been 
presented separately from evidence of plaintiffs' nonuse of 
the seat belts and would have been utilized to show that the 
Commando was designed safely and properly. 
The case of Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 
445 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1978), is directly on point. As 
in this case, the plaintiff in Wilson was injured when his 
vehicle overturned during an accident. As in this case, the 
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plaintiff asserted that his vehicle was defective in design 
because the roof collapsed during the rollover causing a com-
pression fracture of his spine. As in this case, the defen-
dant sought to introduce evidence that the vehicle was 
equipped with seat belts in order to defend the "whole 
automobile•" 
The court in Wilson, however, admitted the defen-
dant's evidence that the accident vehicle had been equipped 
with seat belts for the purpose of determining whether the 
automobile was defectively designed, relying upon the simple 
and logical proposition that the jury would have to determine 
"whether the auto as a whole was defective and unreasonably 
dangerous", 445 F. Supp. at 1371, and that the jury could 
not properly fulfill its function in this regard if it was 
not permitted to take into consideration the presence of a 
safety device, seat belts, that were designed to restrain the 
plaintiff and prevent, or at least minimize, injury. 
As in Wilson, the trial court in this case should 
have permitted the jury to consider the presence of seat 
belts in the Commando. As in Wilson, plaintiffs in this case 
claim that the Commando, the "whole vehicle," is defective 
because it rolled over and collapsed upon them. AMC/Jeep's 
evidence would have shown that the seat belts were installed 
to guard against this type of injury, among others, and that 
the Commando was rendered safer by the presence of the seat 
belts. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The relevance of evidence of the availability of 
seat belts to the issue of the Commando's design cannot be 
doubted• The trial court's ruling in this case, however, 
restricted the jury unduly and permitted it to consider only 
a part of the Commando in deciding whether the Commando, as a 
"whole vehicle," was defective and unreasonably dangerous. 
The result was absurd and prejudicially erroneous for it is 
impossible to design a "crashworthy" vehicle which will 
protect its occupants from serious injury in the event of an 
accident without including in that design the most fundamen-
tal safety feature of all — seat belts. The judgment of the 
trial court must therefore be reversed. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT 
JEEP CORPORATION TO AMEND ITS ANSWER TO 
INCLUDE A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE 
AND IN REFUSING TO DIRECT A VERDICT IN 
FAVOR OF AMC/JEEP BASED ON SUCH DEFENSE. 
Plaintiffs named American Motors Sales Corporation 
and Jeep Corporation as defendants in their Second Amended 
Complaint filed July 31, 1980. (R. 84-87). Defendant Jeep 
Corporation answered on November 11, 1980 (113-114). 
Defendant American Motors Sales Corporation answered, on 
September 12, 1983. (R. 993-995). The critical difference 
between the two answers was that the answer of American 
Motors Sales Corporation contained the following defense: 
"The complaint is barred by Section 78-15-3, Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended." (R. 994). On September 12, 1983, 
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the same day the Answer of American Motors Sales Corporation 
was filed, Jeep Corporation moved the trial court for leave 
to amend its answer to include a defense based on Section 78-
15-3 (R. 983-989). The trial court denied the motion "on the 
basis that the motion was not timely made, the amendment of 
the answer would cause an undue burden upon the plaintiffs 
and other defendants and would result in the continuance of 
the trial date which the Court feels is unjustified under the 
facts and circumstances." (R. 1271-1272). After trial had 
been concluded, AMC/Jeep moved for a directed verdict based 
on Section 73-15-3. It was pointed out to the trial court 
that this defense had been pleaded by American Motors Sales 
Corporation in its initial pleading, but the trial court 
denied the motion. (T., 11/4/83, at 18-19; R. 4774-4775). 
A. The Trial Court Should Have Granted Jeep 
Corporation's Motion to Amend Pursuant to Rule 
15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Jeep Corporation moved the trial court for permis-
sion to amend its answer to assert a defense based on Section 
78-15-3, Utah Code Annotated. That section provides that 
products liability actions are barred if brought "more than 
six years after the date of initial purchase for use or 
consumption...." 
Plaintiffs1 Commando was manufactured by Jeep 
Corporation in December, 1971 (T., 10/25/83, at 930; 
R. 2710), for sale by American Motors Sales Corporation 
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during the 1972 model year. Plaintiffs' accident occurred on 
October 6, 1979 — more than six years after the date the 
Commando was initially purchased. AMC/Jeep contends that 
plaintiffs' accident occurred "more than six years after the 
date of initial purchase for use or consumption" and their 
claims are thus barred by the terms of Section 78-15-3. This 
defense raises a purely legal question based on undisputed 
facts and was raised contemporaneously by the Answer of 
American Motors Sales Corporation. The trial court should 
have granted Jeep Corporation's Motion to Amend under the 
liberal standards of Rule 15(a). 
Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
that a party may amend his pleadings only by leave of court 
or by written consent of the adverse party in the cir-
cumstances presented by this case, and that "leave shall be 
freely given when justice so requires." In Lewis v. 
Moultree, 627 P. 2d 94, 98 (Utah 1981), this Court noted that 
"[t]he rule in this state has always been to allow amendments 
freely where justice requires, and especially is this true 
before trial." (Quoting Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165, 
486 P. 2d 1045, (1971) (emphasis in original)). In the 
same case, this Court clarified the "justice" which the 
liberal amendment rule is meant to further: 
Some tempest has been raised about the 
court allowing the plaintiff to make 
tardy amendments to pleadings. In doing 
so, he [the trial judge] wisely and 
properly stated: 'the pleadings are 
never more important than the cause that 
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is before the court ...• There can be no 
prejudice in this case because we'll give 
ample time to answer . ..." This is in 
harmony with what we regard as the cor-
rect policy: of recognizing the 
desirability of the pleadings setting 
forth definitely framed issues, but also 
of permitting amendment where the inter-
est of justice so requires, and the 
adverse party is given a fair opportunity 
to meet it. 
627 P. 2d, at 98 (emphasis added), quoting Thomas J. Peck & 
Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 187, 515 P. 
2d 446 (1973) . 
The trial court's denial of Jeep Corporation's 
Motion to Amend ignores this Court's liberal construction of 
Rule 15(a). Most importantly, the trial court's statement, 
in its order denying the Motion to Amend, that ,fthe amendment 
of the answer would cause an undue burden upon the plaintiffs 
and other defendants and would result in the continuance of 
the trial date" is plainly belied by the fact that American 
Motors Sales Corporation interposed precisely the same 
defense in its Answer. (R. 994). It can hardly be said that 
any party would have been prejudiced by Jeep Corporation's 
interposing a defense that was properly and contemporaneously 
interposed in the answer of American Motors Sales 
Corporation. The issue was before the trial court and 
"justice required" that Jeep Corporation be allowed to amend 
its answer so that it might accord with the answer of its 
affiliated corporation. 
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Eastridge v. Fruehauf Corporation, 52 F.R.D. 129 
(W.D. Ky. 1971) (applying Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure which is identical to the Utah rule), demonstrates 
the proper approach to a motion to amend an answer to add a 
statute of limitations defense. The plaintiff in Eastridge 
sued the defendant for personal injuries allegedly incurred 
on account of the defendant's negligence. Sometime after he 
had filed his original answer, the defendant moved the trial 
court for leave to amend pursuant to Rule 15(a) so that he 
might add a defense based on a statute of limitations. The 
trial court granted the Motion to Amend, and noted the 
following: 
Statute of limitations are designed 
primarily to assure fairness to 
defendants; they promote justice by 
preventing surprises through revival of 
claims that have been allowed to slumber 
until the evidence has been lost, 
memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared; in other words the defense 
was designed to protect citizens from 
stale and vexatious claims. 
The merits of this defense in the instant 
action are unimportant at this time; 
however, the purpose and legislative 
intent involved in the enactment of this 
affirmative defense have a very worthy 
objective and accordingly, depending on 
the surrounding circumstances, such 
purpose should not be treated with 
indifference. 
Where no prejudice results to the adverse 
party, the Statute of Limitations can be 
subsequently pleaded in an amended 
answer, and there is no waiver of such 
defense if the answer is properly amended 
to include it. 
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52 F.R.D., at 131. See also Bireline v. Seagondollar', 567 F. 
2d 260, 262 (4th Cir. 1977); American Air Filter Company, 
Inc. v. Industrial Decking and Roofing Corp., 82 F.R.D. 681 
(E-.D. Tenn. 1979). 
The sound reasoning of the court in Eastridge is 
directly applicable to this case. Utah's interests in 
protecting manufacturers against "stale and vexatious claims" 
is given voice in Section 78-15-3 and should not have been 
"treated with indifference" by the trial court. Particularly 
in light of the fact that the issue was properly before the 
trial court in the Answer of American Motors Sales 
Corporation, there was no justification for the trial court's 
denial of Jeep Corporation's Rule 15(a) motion. Such denial 
was an abuse of discretion which deprived Jeep Corporation of 
the possible protection of Section 78-15-3 and which requires 
that the trial court's judgment be reversed. 
B. The Trial Court Should have Granted 
AMC/Jeep's Motion for Directed Verdict 
Based on the Statute of Limitations. 
After the trial had been concluded, AMC/Jeep moved 
for a directed verdict based on the limitations period con-
tained in Section 78-15-3. As has been noted above, this 
issue was squarely presented in the Answer of American Motors 
Sales Corporation. The motion was denied without comment by 
the trial court. (T., 11/4/83, at 18-19; R. 4774-4775). The 
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trial court's action in this regard is in derogation of 
Section 78-15-3. 
As quoted above, the limitations period in the Utah 
Product Liability Act bars actions brought "more than six 
years after the date of initial purchase for use or 
consumption...." Plaintiffs' Commando was manufactured in 
1971 for sale in the 1972 model year. The accident occurred 
more than six years later, in 1979. Under the plain language 
of Section 78-15-3, plaintiffs' action against AMC/Jeep was 
time barred. The trial court's failure to direct a verdict 
on this ground was erroneous and the trial court's judgment 
should therefore be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's judgment on the verdict cannot be 
sustained and must be reversed and a new trial or the entry 
of judgment for AMC/Jeep ordered for six independently suffi-
cient reasons: 
First, a new trial is required because the trial 
court erred in permitting plaintiffs to introduce irrelevant 
and inflammatory evidence; 
Second, a new trial is required because the trial 
court compounded its first error by blocking AMC/Jeep's 
efforts to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts; 
Third, a new trial is required because the trial 
court capped its evidentiary errors by excluding virtually 
{ 
all of AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence; 
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Fourthi a new trial is required because the trial 
court erred in failing to grant AMC/Jeep's motion for a 
mistrial based upon opposing counsels1 closing arguments 
which stated that AMC/Jeep was "afraid" to produce the very 
demonstrative evidence that had been previously excluded by 
the trial court; 
Fifth, a new trial is required because the trial 
court erroneously excluded all evidence relating to the 
presence of and plaintiffs' failure to utilize seat belts; 
and 
Sixth, entry of judgment in favor of AMC/Jeep is 
required because the trial court erred in failing to direct a 
verdict based on AMC/Jeep's statute of limitations defense. 
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